The development of reliable distributed software is simplified by the ability to assume a fail-stop failure model. We discuss the emulation of such a model in an asynchronous distributed environment. The solution we propose, called Strong-GMP, can be supported through a highly efficient protocol, and has been implemented as part of a distributed systems software project at Cornell University. Here, we focus on the precise definition of the problem, the protocol, correctness proofs, and an analysis of costs.
Mach is widely cited for its simple and powerful communications model, and has emerged as an industry standard. However, it is easy to see that this model cannot be implemented in a way that is both safe and live: the only "safe" way to detect a failure is to wait for the faulty process to restart, and this can introduce unbounded delays! At the time of this writing, Mach waits for failed nodes to restart before reporting failures, hence even a single failure could prevent the system from making progress.
Our work proposes an approach which, although subject to limitations stemming from the impossibility results cited above, is nonetheless extremely powerful. The basic idea is to substitute a logical notion of system membership for the physical notion of "operational"
or "failed". In our scheme, application programs define operational processes to be those listed by the membership service and failed processes to be those not listed as members of the system. To the extent that the membership service is able to report consistent information to processes using it, those processes can then implement consistent, fault-tolerant distributed algorithms.
Our membership service assumes a low-level mechanism that monitors the status of pro- 4Because the communication layer is asynchronous, messages from an excluded process may continue to arrive, and be rejected, for an unbounded period of time. The communication layer would also inform an excluded process that it has been excluded, causing it to rejoin the system under a new process identifier.
The protocols needed to implement such a transport layer are evident and will not be presented here.
2.3
The 
The Modal Logic
So far, our description of Strong GMP refers to when core members agree on the group view, as well as the degree of simultaneity with which they do so. A temporal modal logic allows us to express these notions. Unique to our logic is its attention to asynchrony -the basic semantic entities of the logic are consistent cuts. We briefly describe the temporal modalities we use to specify Strong GMP.
Given a propositional formula, ¢, and the < relation between cuts, the formula [3¢ holds along cut c precisely when ¢ holds along all future cuts in all runs containing c (i.e. every c' such that c < c'). _¢ holds along c when ¢ will hold along some future cut in every run containing c. We interpret _ as "inevitability". _¢ holds along c if ¢ held at some c' < c, and Be if ¢ held along all c' < c. 
Formal Specification
otherwise. To avoid this, our specification forces q to be in S whenever it is in GpViews(c ) :
The formula UNDEF'D(GpViews(c))
5In practice, the group view, and therefore each core member's local view, includes the entire system membership in addition to the MRM composition; here we are only concerned with the MRM composition.
The reverseinclusion follows trivially sincep _5 LocalViewp(c).
Consequently, our specification requires S = GpViews(c ).
To finish the single-process illusion, the MRM must be unique. We will therefore also 
Strong GMP Specification
We now have the language necessary to formalize Strong GMP. Since formulas are evaluated along cuts we drop references to cuts in indexical sets.
GMP-0
(Base Case) An initial group view eventually exists: 
=> _> OPERATINGp(q).
In contrast to FAULTYp(q), Figure  3 local views differ along the second cut so the group view is undefined. In Figure 8 , < v, z > is committed invisibly to p, q, and r. Since all three have identical local views, r will not detect the actual discrepancy. However, p is aware of mgr's intention to commit < v, z >, and p can envision a situation in which mgv succeeded in doing so and then failed (in this case, the situation that actually occurred). If p were to forward mgr's intention to commit < v, z >, v would then envision the same situation and propagate < v, z > as its Phase II submission. Thus, in addition to its local view, an outer member must also report how it expects to change its local view next.
We have described how a reconfigurer may discover two different values were proposed for the same group version. In S-GMP the reconfigurer propagates the value proposed by the process of least rank among those making proposals (Procedure GetStableProposal in the Appendix). Proposition 5.7 proves this choices ensures GMP-2 and GMP-3. 7In several years of wide use no problems have ever been traced to the restart scheme. Note also that limiting cold-start to a single, known, site suffices to guarantee uniqueness of the initial view but unfortunately this scheme is now vulnerable to a liveness problem: we may be unable to restart the system after a crash. To illustrate the difficulty in proving Sequence (GMP-3) consider the following situation, depicted in Figure  9 . Let r be a reconfigurer with ver(r) = x, and let Acks(r,R-int(z)) (we use R-int(ver(r)) rather than R-int(state(r)) to get explicit reference to r's local version) be a majority subset of kocalView_. 
Proof
Let q E Ahead_ and let p be as described.
Since q received l:t-int(x) from r after corn(< v_+_, x + 1 >) from p, it must be that rank(r) < rank(p), so FAULTVq(p) holds for every such q in Acks(r, Ft-±nt(x)) (by Gossip). As a result, the initiator p can be successful for Proof GMP-3 will be violated if p is able to commit < vx+2, x + 2 > and r is able to commit < -Acks(r,R-int(x)),x + 2 >. We proceed by analyzing the messages arriving at
Vz+I. 
The gossip property and rank(p) < rank(p') mean that a majority of p's local view believe it faulty upon receiving R-int(z -1) from p'. Disconnect means that
The question is whether any a E A receives R-sub(< v, x >) from p, which could only happen before it receives R-int(z -1) from p': r cvo(p,a-sub(< v,x >)) r cv (p',a-i=t(x-1)) --*faultyo(p). GpView _-I since it is disjoint from Acks(p', R-int(z -1)) which is a majority subset.
We have just proven the base case for the proposition -when r is the first bivalent reconfigurer (it is not hard to see that 'first' is meaningful and well-defined in the context of successful initiators for a given group view 
